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INTRODUCTION
Nuclear power provides 17% of the world's electricity,
including 20% of U. S. electricity generation (and 70% of
France's). Yet, controversy continues to surround the industry.
Supporters argue that technology and engineering practices have
achieved suitable safety and efficiency levels after decades of
experience. The contained effects of the accidents at Three Mile
Island and Chernobyl are looked upon as proof that the system
works (under almost worst-case scenarios), and that fossil fuel
alternatives are far more dangerous (Blix, 1989). The problem,
they say, lies in the public's fear of anything nuclear, demand
for a level of safety beyond that in other energy industries, and
the resultant climate of intense government regulation (Koutz,
1989).
Yet, this positive view of the industry is contested by
those who argue that nuclear power generation is inherently so
complex and interlinked that accidents are inevitable (Perrow,
1984), that there are some poorly run plants, that U. S. plants
are not as well run as those in several other countries (Hansen
et al., 1989), and that the industry focuses on performance
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indicators that portray it favorably rather than on safety
behaviors that are more questionable (Marcus et al., 1989). In
particular, variations in safety and efficiency seem attributable
to organization and management rather than to technology.
This paper provides a conceptual framework and discussion of
the management and organization of nuclear power plants. Our
objectives are summarized by two questions: (1) How should
nuclear power plants be organized and managed to ensure that they
are operated most safely and efficiently? and (2) What does an
understanding of the organization and management of nuclear power
plants tell us about how they change or resist change? The
latter question presumes that achieving and maintaining
excellence depends upon a continual process of change. To answer
both questions, we need to address a more proximal one: What
indicators or measures of various characteristics and processes
of nuclear power plants are needed in order to address the above
questions? Therefore, this paper is directed at the problem of
indicator development as a basis for empirical research.
To discuss this problem effectively, we first present
arguments for the importance of nuclear power plants as
worthwhile objects of study. Following, we suggest
organizational change and learning as windows through which we
present our conceptual and theoretical approach to NPPs as
organizations. We then review existing literature on the
organization and management of NPPs, and suggest how we would
structure a research project.
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WHY STUDY NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS?
There are three reasons why nuclear power plants (NPPs)
appear to be appropriate for organization-based study: they are
a major public concern and social issue, they are particularly
difficult to manage, and performance seems especially sensitive
to management and organizational practices within the context of
a relatively uniform and mature technology (excepting some Soviet
reactors).
Public Safety and Confidence
NPPs represent a high-hazard technology. That is, if a
complete failure of a nuclear power plant were to occur, there is
some probability that there would be considerable injury and loss
of life. Although the probability of catastrophe may be low, the
public has a high dread of nuclear accidents (Fischhoff et al,
1981). Mistakes and accidents in the nuclear industry have been
well-publicized, and public confidence in the competence and
selflessness of the industry is low in most of the world. This
high hazard, low confidence industry therefore poses an
interesting and socially-relevant forum for investigation.
An Extreme Management Task
Second, NPPs are extremely difficult to manage. This arises
from the highly demanding nature of both their internal and
external environments. Perrow (1984) sees the problem of
internal management as a product of complexity and tight coupling
of the power plant technology. First, the technology is so
complex that it is inherently unknowable. Because many events
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occur invisibly and are not immediately comprehensible, no
individual or organization can get such a complete understanding
of the operation of the system that its behavior becomes
completely predictable. Second, the individual components of the
systems are very highly coupled because of fixed sequences,
critical timing elements, little slack, and few buffers and
substitutions. Therefore, the failure of any individual
component in a system can lead to rapid changes, and often
failures, in other components. Operators, with their faulty
mental models, are likely to misinterpret the events and
exacerbate the problems. When these two characteristics, high
complexity and high coupling, are brought together, NPPs are seen
as highly susceptible to "system accidents," simultaneous and
unpredictable failures of interdependent systems.
To make matters worse, the external environments of NPPs are
both extremely demanding and highly constraining. The plants are
subjected to an aggressive regulatory environment of government
agencies, utility groups, and insurers, and to intense scrutiny
by public interest groups, media, and others. These groups make
strong demands on the organization, place severe restrictions on
its management and ability to obtain income, and bombard it with
information. For example, such extreme scrutiny and anxiety may
lead plant managers to enhance safety at the cost of efficiency
by having redundant systems, shutdowns in response to minor
problems, and so forth. But, safety may be eroded as well if low
public opinion leads qualified people to refuse to work for NPPs
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or leads utilities to deprive plants of resources since they are
in a declining sector. Yet, openness to the environment is
important because other plants are having operating experiences
which may provide vital information for future safety.
The recognition of the difficulties in managing plants leads
to three alternative prescriptions. At the pessimistic end,
Perrow (1984) argues that nuclear power plants are so complex and
highly coupled, and the potential hazards so great, that safe
learning is impossible. Underlying this is the assumption that
learning occurs when there is a mismatch between system
performance and our expectations (Argyris and Schon, 1978). For
example, we might learn that we need positive indicators of valve
position rather than temperature readings that are too easily
misinterpreted (which happened at TMI). In the case of a nuclear
power plant, such trial-and-error learning could involve a
serious accident and, hence, unnecessary risk.
On a more optimistic note, Wildavsky (1988) argues that much
learning occurs through the understanding of minor mismatches in
performance. Therefore, performance improvements can occur
without major incidents or accidents. He exemplifies his
argument by tracing the histories of technologies such as fuel
pipelines, which were once considered very dangerous but are now
thought relatively benign.
The regulatory community (e.g. IAEA, 1988) argues that while
the technology may not be completely knowable, it is possible to
construct a series of independent (de-coupled) organizational and
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technological barriers which will contain an accident. If the
probability of each barrier being violated is low enough, then
the cumulative probability of accident will be very low. This
approach, known in the industry as "Defense in Depth," is
consistent with Perrow's recommendations for increasing safety by
reducing high coupling.
However, the fact remains that the management and
organizational designers of NPPs face a more difficult task than
other organizations which are less complex and/or more loosely
coupled, in which small mistakes or problems cannot mushroom into
events with catastrophic potential for the company and the
public. LaPorte and Consolini (1989) consider "failure-free
performance" to be a key challenge for organizational theory.
The study of NPPs, therefore, is a study of organizations "at the
edge," coping with extreme demands.
Performance Depends on Management Rather Than Technology
The final reason why nuclear plants are empirically very
interesting is that there is considerable variation in safety and
performance that is hard to attribute to the basic technology.
Most Nuclear Steam Supply Systems (outside the centrally-planned
economies) are built around light water reactors and are
manufactured by one of a few manufacturers. Similarly, there is
relatively little variation in the designs of the Balance of
Plant (turbines, generators, etc.). However, each plant may be a
unique combination of design and components, with the degree of
diversity in the technology varying from country to country and
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utility to utility within countries. The U.S., with its large
number of utilities and early entry into the industry, has the
highest diversity. France, with one utility, uses one design for
each generation of reactor in service. Finland, presumably for
political reasons, has two U.S.-designed reactors and two
designed in the U.S.S.R.
However, studies indicate that much of the variability in
performance cannot be attributed to variations in the basic
technology itself. For example, Swiss and Japanese plants
operate at very high efficiency (power production as a percent of
potential production), and have very few unplanned outages or
other safety incidents. Within each country, the various plants
operate at very similar levels of efficiency and safety, although
their reactors vary substantially in design (Beckjord et al.,
1987).
Furthermore, performance variations cannot all be explained
by variations in the external environment such as the form of
regulation. For example, Beckjord et al. (1987) found that the
U.S., with as many light water reactors as the rest of the world
combined, had as much variance in operational performance
(measured as mean and variance in % availability) as the other
five countries they studied, indicating that regulation cannot be
explaining performance differentials. Furthermore, they found
that differences in regulatory structure were not terribly great
anyway.
This does not mean, however, that objective circumstances
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are completely irrelevant. Some technology effects have been
observed. Samanta et al. (1988) found that different reactor
designs had different inherent sensitivity to operator error.
They found that Babcock and Wilcox reactors were much more
sensitive to differences in the probabilities than those of other
vendors, although their study is difficult to interpret because
of a methodological artifact. Beckjord et al. (1987) and INPO
(1988) both found differences in the performance of pressurized
vs. boiling water reactors. A generation of Soviet reactors
lacking emergency core cooling systems and effective containment
are very sensitive to error, as we discovered at Chernobyl.
Institutional effects have also been observed. Lester
(1986) found that the high horizontal disaggreggation and low
vertical integration of the nuclear power supply industry led to
diminished economic performance and learning both in construction
and operation of plants. Lester and McCabe (1988) found that
industrial structure, especially the level of disaggregation, had
an effect on French and U.S. utilities' ability to learn.
Regulatory institutions may also matter. Suzuki and Hansen
(1988) found that various elements of safety regulation in the
U.S. and Japan affected safety performance. For example, the
presence of MITI enabled standardization of designs and
approaches, and this affected performance. Beckjord et al.
(1987) found that the U.S. was the only low-performing country
that did not appear to be learning how to operate its plants
better with time, and implied that the problem may arise from the
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high level of antagonism between the various actors in the U. S.
industry.
Thus, despite the importance of technological, economic, and
institutional factors, it appears that significant performance
variability is due to management and organizational factors. If
that is the case, then we need a model of NPP performance that
includes management and organizational factors, and a model of
organizational change that would guide efforts to improve plant
performance. In the next section, we argue that models of
performance and models of change are closely interrelated.
LEARNING AND CHANGE
Changes in plant practices and policies require a process to
get from the current situation to the new one (Schein, 1980).
Nuclear plants change continually, as do all organizations, yet
some kinds of changes are quite difficult to make. We need to
identify the change process in nuclear plants, including barriers
to change, and strategies to overcome these barriers. It is
quite interesting, for example, that U. S. plants are
disinterested in the practices of European and Japanese plants,
whereas those countries regularly seek new information from the
U. S. Our Japanese colleagues report that the Europeans are
regular visitors at their plants, but the Americans never come
there. In part, this reflects the traditional role of the U. S.
as the source of nuclear technology. However, that parochial
attitude is now outdated as foreign nuclear industries surpass
the U. S. in size and performance, and may become the source of
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new technology and new management practices.
The problem of learning has been described by Marcus,
Bromily, and Nichols (1989). They note that the Bhopal,
Challenger and TMI accidents were preceded by adequate warnings
that something was amiss. Bhopal was preceded by two phosgene
leaks at the site, Challenger was preceded by Roger Boisjoly's
appeal that the O-rings could fail, and TMI was preceded by Davis
Besse. In reflecting on TMI, GPU President Herman Dieckamp said,
"To me that is probably one of the most significant learnings of
the whole accident [TMI] the degree to which the inadequacies of
that experience feedback loop... significantly contributed to
making us and the plant vulnerable to this accident" (Kemeny,
1979a, p. 192). Marcus et al. note that "One can examine almost
all recent disasters and find that warnings were given but not
heeded. ... The fact is that problems that lead to major
tragedies may not be appropriately recognized. It is hard to
distinguish the true 'signal' from the 'noise'" (p. 116).
The essential problem with learning is that it takes place
against a background of expectations and current understandings.
That is, for people to detect a mismatch between their
assumptions about the nature of the system and the actual system,
they have to have a working "mental model" of the system they are
operating. However, as we noted above, Perrow (1984) argues that
many accidents occur through unexpected interactions in complex,
highly coupled, systems. The fundamental implication of this
argument is that the technology is inherently unknowable. That
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is, we cannot construct a valid model of the technological
system. If his argument is correct, it follows that it is
impossible to differentiate the noise from the signal and,
therefore, it is impossible to learn.
Rather than suggesting that learning in this case is a
problem of information processing, we think it is worth
investigating whether or not the signal and the noise are
virtually inseparable. There is so much noise and so little
signal, and the cognitive model is so ill-defined, that a
mismatch cannot be detected. In this case, both safe management
and learning require noise reduction. Safe management require
noise reduction because it is otherwise impossible to know
whether or not ominous signals have been attended to. Learning
requires noise reduction to increase the ratio of signal-to-noise
in the hope that the signals which define the boundary of the
known part of the technology might be detected. (Embedded in
this is the assumption that there is no misinformation flowing
around which, if heeded, would do damage to the organization.)
Given this, a good management strategy minimizes the amount
of information flow (by reducing the amount generated, not by
censoring it) and maximizes the organization's ability to absorb
it. Information flow into the organization can be minimized by
careful management of the external environment (e.g. Maine
Yankee's strategy of meeting regulators' needs immediately so
they do not have to be dealt with multiple times and so the
regulators do not have to go into the organization looking for
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problems). Information flows within the organization are
minimized by such things as reducing maintenance backlogs.
Barriers to information flow are removed by allowing for smooth
flow of information into the organization and development of
systems to deal with it. Internal barriers are removed by
ensuring smooth interfaces between units.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PERFORMANCE
The development of an approach to the study of NPPs demands
a more specific understanding of NPPs as structured entities
responding to internal and external forces and objectives.
Marcus et al. (1989) provide a framework for linking management
and organizational factors to performance (their own focus is
safety, but it is rather simple to extend this to performance in
general). This framework separates causal factors, intermediate
outcomes, and safety (or performance in general). The causal
factors are environment (region, resources), context
(technology), organizational governance, organizational design,
and emergent processes (learning, culture, cross-functional
relations, training, attitudes, stress, etc.). The intermediate
outcomes are efficiency, compliance to normative prescriptions,
quality of construction and operation, and innovation. The
safety indicators (scrams, significant events, etc.) are the
final outcomes.
We believe that there are five issues that must be
considered in evaluating the relationship between organization
and management of NPPs and operating efficiency:
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1. The impact of the external environment (society,
technology, industry, regulators, etc.) on organizational
characteristics;
2. The way in which the organization defines its objectives
(in relation to both external and internal constituencies);
3. The way in which the organization sets up people, tools,
and tasks in order to accomplish its objectives;
4. The processes by which members of the organization enact
behavior within this structure (within and between organizational
units) in order to accomplish organizational and personal
objectives; and
5. The ways in which the organization reactively or
proactively initiates and implements change in any of the above
elements and relationships.
We will first look at the issue of objectives and
performance, and try to understand how to consider multiple
system goals (beyond just one goal such as safety), building on
the work of Osborn et al. (1983; Marcus et al., 1989). Secondly,
we will develop an approach to the management and organization of
NPPs based on open socio-technical systems models, arguing for
interdependence among technology (the application of knowledge to
do work, Rousseau, 1979), human factors, social interactions. and
external demands and resources. Third, we will look closely at
the structure and processes of organizations, and argue that the
ability to learn underlies long-term success. However, the very
high complexity of nuclear power plants makes this very
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difficult; organizational practices and procedures implicitly
establish or block this process. Finally, we look at how the
various components of this model can be measured, in terms of
indicators.
Objectives and Performance
Organizations have multiple objectives which they use to
define their relationship to both their external environment
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and their core technology (Thompson,
1967). Common strategic objectives include maximizing
shareholder wealth, return on equity, and growth (measured in
various ways), minimizing risk, and achieving industry primacy.
These objectives, and the relative weight they are accorded, can
be both long and short term, can vary from organization to
organization, and can vary within organizations over time. This
raises two questions: First, what are the objectives of nuclear
utilities? and, second, what happens when they are accorded
differential priority?
The most obvious goal of a nuclear plant is to generate
electricity. Most observers of the nuclear industry infer two
other goals: financial performance and safety. In a country
with a nationalized industry, power generation (availability)
could be the primary goal, with cost control and safety as
secondary goals or constraints. In the U. S., private utilities
may view long-term financial performance as the real goal, with
availability and safety as necessary sub-goals.
A recent trend has been to make safety the key objective.
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Suzuki and Hansen (1988) found that stronger emphasis on safety
as an organizational objective led to improved safety performance
in Japan, when compared to the U.S. The IAEA (1988) argued that
nuclear utilities need to develop a "safety culture." Clearly,
this is a statement that safety should be a primary objective of
utilities, and that the strategy to achieve safety should become
implicit in all activities, ie., part of the culture. The
nuclear industry has made careful lists of the performance
objectives for NPPs. For example, INPO (1987) provides
descriptions of the proper goals and criteria for organizational
structure, management involvement, maintainance, human resources,
and other functional departments or areas within plants.
However, these tend to be lists of desirable characteristics
without detail on how to achieve them or how to prioritize among
them.
More useful for our purposes, however, is the work of Osborn
et al. (1983) who argued that the goals of safety and
profitability are best pursued through four sub-goals or
operational goals: quality, innovation, efficiency, and
compliance to normative prescriptions. They could not make an
empirical causal link because there have been too few serious
incidents (examples of non-safety) to make any real tests.
Marcus et al. (1989) argued that a safe organization is one which
manages to actively pursue these simultaneously. Their analysis
of the management problem for nuclear power plants then becomes
one of trade-offs among objectives and innovative solutions for
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managing multiple objectives.
We can not, however, specify how best to make these trade-
offs. For example, long-term good performance depends on a
balance between compliance with good practices, thus avoiding
degeneration and complacency, and innovation to adapt to changes
and make the achievement of objectives easier over time.
Mintzberg (1988) argues that managers have to deal with the
contradictions between "machine-like compliance" demanded by the
standard operation and maintenance of NPPs, and innovative
responses to unexpected occasional problems requiring
communication with a professional layer of engineers. Marcus et
al. (1989) suggest that good performance may foster routinization
and complacency and thereby reduce future performance, and that
enhanced safety may come at the cost of efficiency in the short
run but increase efficiency (and profits and other outcome
measures) in the long run.
We would expect that organizations with differences in the
relative weight of objectives would differ in their relative
performance with regard to those objectives. For example, Osborn
and Jackson (1988) inferred that utilities with a higher
dependence on nuclear power for organizational survival would
accord safety a higher priority. They postulated, and found,
that such utilities ran NPPs with better safety performance.
However, the above research and the previously-reviewed
research on environmental and technological predictors of
performance, give little insight on how these factors result in
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good or poor performance. How, for example, is innovation
achieved through changes in the technology (e.g., making it more
linear and less tightly-coupled, Perrow, 1984) and in the
organization (e.g., culture, management practices)? We argue
that the understanding of NPPs requires specification of the
nature of organizational structures and processes that play
crucial roles in plant performance. It is to this topic that we
now turn.
Organizations as Systems
Organizations translate their strategic objectives into a
structure (Chandler, 1962) subject to the constraints of their
core technology (Thompson, 1967) and their environment (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). Over time, as a result of learning, they may
attempt to modify both the core technology and the environment to
make their tasks easier.
However, when considering these elements, it is important to
realize that it is impossible to fully understand social and
technological phenomena independently. The plant must be seen as
a co-evolving system of mutually inter-dependent social
interaction and technology, as symbolized in Figure 1. For
example, lengthy procedure manuals that routinize or "script"
operator interventions have dual effects: operator error is
reduced where proper responses to known scenarios can be built
into the equipment or the procedure manuals, but operator error
may be increased if the increased boredom and unattractiveness of
the job lead to a less motivated and less skilled operator team
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which may be less capable of dealing with "non-scripted"
emergencies.
Time and again, efforts to improve organizational
performance by introducing new technologies have produced
disappointing results. Instead, it is the combination of new
technologies and new patterns of training and coordination that
seem to make the most of new opportunities (e.g. auto industry
use of automation and robotics, MacDuffie & Krafcik, 1989).
Organizations systematically underestimate what has to be done to
make technological innovations pay off (McKersie & Walton, 1989).
It is also impossible to separate completely the "structure"
of organizations, expressed as formal roles, functions, and
procedures, from the "processes" by which the work of the
organization is "enacted" (Weick, 1979). Even as organization
designers and engineers try to embody their objectives in a pre-
planned structure (a more detailed version of Figure 1), the
informal organization or "emergent processes" represent a level
of detail or time-scale of action that cannot be ignored (i.e.,
behaviors that occur within the subsystems in Figure 1 and across
the "interfaces" between subsystems). Although we will discuss
structure issues and process issues as if they were two topics,
this apparent separation is for communicative efficiency.
Core and periphery. Although organizations must "fit" their
technology, environment, and strategy, different parts of an
organization fit in different ways. As Thompson (1967) argued, a
central part of the organization is built around its core
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technology and the necessary interdependencies in the
transformation of inputs to outputs. For NPPs, that core
technology is the sequence of nuclear reaction, steam generation,
and electric power production. The core organizational units of
the plant are operations, engineering, and (somewhat less
obviously) maintainance.
The organization surrounds that core with input and output
activities essential to its functioning, but decidedly secondary
in importance, such as health physics and personnel. The
organization carries out these secondary input and output
activities, rather than purchasing services and materials on the
market, to buffer the core from fluctuations in the environment
(e.g., suppliers, customers, regulators, shareholders, and
competitors) which would otherwise interrupt core production
(c.f. Williamson 1975). For example, a unit such as public
relations can buffer the organization from public opinion by
running a visitors' center to educate the public about nuclear
power and environmental issues.
The more important input/output functions are
"transformative" activities (Cebon, 1990) that attempt to produce
the best possible match between the core and the environment
(Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), by exchanging relevant information and
resources (including people) with the environment. Less
important input/output functions are "peripheral." Some
peripheral functions such as security can be purchased from
suppliers rather than directly managed. Which input/output
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functions are in transformative positions depends upon
organizational strategy, given constraints placed on the
organization by its institutional environment (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and the core technology. As
safety is elevated in importance, we expect to see the
organization becoming more responsive to the legitimate safety
concerns coming from the environment. For example, we might see
a cooperative rather than an adversarial relationship developing
with the NRC.
Coordination and structure. Organizational units are
created by grouping together people who must interact the most
and are reciprocally interdependent (require extensive
information from each other or exchange physical resources).
Therefore, each input/output activity is likely to be the
responsibility of a particular unit (Thompson, 1967; Nadler &
Tushman, 1988). These units will be linked in ways that minimize
communication difficulties (Galbraith, 1977; Malone & Smith,
1988).
However, for organizations with multiple and competing
objectives, such as safety and efficiency, there may not be one
best arrangement of communication paths among organizational
units (cf. Arrow, 1970). Such an organization needs multiple
communication paths, making the nature of interaction across the
interfaces between units important and difficult to manage
centrally. That is why the decentralized, networked organization
is becoming a more prominent form (Galbraith & Kazanjian, 1988).
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However, the same complexity can lead to situations in which
key systems are the joint responsibility of several different
people without clear lines of authority, resulting in numerous
meetings to negotiate accountability and implementation of
change. One utility, for example, has a fire protection officer
at each plant, but also a fire protection engineer, a fire
protection program manager, and a fire protection matrix manager
at the utility, as well as electrical engineering and project
engineering managers. It is not clear who is in charge, or how
to implement new programs (presumably another project engineer
would be appointed, who would have to negotiate with all the
other interested parties, but who would not have authority nor
accountability for changes).
Organizational Processes
If we consider our definition of process - the way people
carry out tasks in order to accomplish objectives - then it is
reasonable to classify organizational processes by their
relationship to the components of the definition. This suggests
categories such as the following: (a) the processes by which
people are brought into the company, the characteristics they
thereby bring with them, and the way they are socialized and
trained; and (b) the procedures established to define and carry
out tasks, including assigning people to various roles. Note the
assumption that people carry out organizational procedures: if a
group does something, it is the people in the group that actually
perform activities.
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Selectinc and managin- people. The career paths of plant
personnel in U. S. plants tend to be very different from
comparable ones in Europe and Japan. For example, U. S.
operators tend to be high-school educated, and to have come
through trades such as electrician and machinist. Many received
their experience in the nuclear Navy; other personnel were
promoted from fossil fuel plants into better-paying nuclear
plants. Although operators receive formal training and
licensing, their education may not be sufficient for the demands
of unusual or emergency situations. They may not understand the
underlying physics of the plant and, as was the case with Three
Mile Island, may use a faulty "mental model" of the plant in
responding to problems and thereby exacerbate the situation. In
contrast, plant operators in many European countries (e.g.,
Switzerland) get specialized technical training through
educational tracks that take a very different approach to
"vocational" education. Such technical workers are much more
sophisticated, and much closer in status to engineers, than is
the case in this country. This affects both the available know-
how to run the plant, and the relations among various functional
groups in the plant.
Organizational processes are enacted by people whose
characteristics influence and are influenced by the organization.
For example, the culture of an organization consists of artifacts
such as behaviors and physical objects, beliefs and values, and
underlying basic assumptions that are usually outside awareness
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(Schein, 1985). U. S. NPPs are a meeting place of several
cultures: The "engineering" culture of the designers and
builders of the plant, the "fossil fuel plant" culture that
produced many of the control room and maintenance personnel who
transferred to the more glamorous and better-paying nuclear
plants, the blue-collar machinist-electrician culture, the
"Nuclear Navy" culture, and so forth. These cultural groups have
substantial differences in education, status, skills, and modes
of work. For example, Eagan (1982) contrasts the engineering
world as one of the "mind" while the operators deal with feedback
of the "hand." In at least some plants, members of each group
tends to think that they alone know how to "really" operate the
plant: communication may be strained or misleading; cooperation
may be difficult to obtain. For example, operators may have
little say in configuring the plant or dealing with problems, and
the engineering solutions may be unrealistic and/or resisted by
the plant culture.
Managers are known to differ in the underlying assumptions
they make about the competency and motivation of various groups
of employees. For example, "Theory X" managers (McGregor, 1960)
make management responsible for motivating and controlling
workers who are assumed to be self-interested. In contrast,
"Theory Y" managers believe that workers want to participate and
contribute, and management should strive to encourage workers to
develop their skills.
Such managerial assumptions, when shared, become embodied in
23
organizational incentives and control systems. NPPs can be run
as "low trust" organizations that want the operators (and others)
to follow the book, let the automatic systems run the plant until
the right procedures are located, respond only to symptoms, check
and double check everyone's actions, and so forth. Or, they can
be run as "high trust" organizations that rely on the personnel
to take initiative, innovate, diagnose underlying causes, and
exercise their discretion. The culture of the organization thus
will be reflected in the kind of personnel it attracts and
socializes, and the kind of learning it encourages and permits.
Procedures for task accomplishment. There are many
different ways to accomplish what appears to be the "same" task.
Many plants seem to operate in a passive mode, somewhat
homeostatic, unchanging unless forced to change by an accident at
the plant, a major event such as TMI, or prodding by the NRC. On
the other hand, both Connecticut Yankee and Maine Yankee are very
proactive in their dealings with the NRC. They have created
procedures to find small problems before they become big
problems, which involves open channels of communication within
the plant and between the plant and the outside world. A sincere
commitment to safety (a "safety culture") would presumably reward
or recognize people who identify problems, even if these lead to
plant shutdowns, rather than trying to avoid problems in order to
keep "steaming" (ie., running the plant until planned shutdown;
note that the recent Japanese accident involved a problem that
emerged a few days before planned shutdown, Mainichi Daily News,
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1989).
As a good example of activities carried out between people
in the same unit, consider shifts of operators in control rooms,
who are generally constituted as teams who train and work
together. Team members are rotated together from shift to shift,
and train together on simulators. Team performance therefore
depends not only on individual training and competence, but also
on the team's ability to share information and duties. Further,
performance depends on managing the interface between the team
and others outside the control room who provide information and
carry out activities such as investigation, maintainance, and so
forth.
As an example of processes that act across unit boundaries,
consider the problem of managing the flow of information across
the organizational boundary. Information about technical
developments and operations experience must flow into the plant
and have impact, in order to avoid the TMI situation in which
accident precursors in other plants were not communicated to the
TMI operators. Similarly, information about the plant must flow
outward to the owners, NRC, INPO, and public. The continued
ability of the plant to attract resources (money, personnel)
depends on their management of this information flow.
Indicators of Management and Orqanizational Factors
As we have discussed, the detailed studies of TMI concluded
that management and organizational factors (at plant and
institutional levels) are associated with safety. More recent
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studies draw the same conclusions (e.g., Ryan, 1988; Morey &
Huey, 1988; Reason, 1988; Hansen, et al., 1989). Although NPPs,
INPO, NRC and others collect enormous amounts of data, good
indicators of management and organization are not yet available.
Even good data on staffing, budgets, and organizational charts do
not exist (Marcus et al., p. 93).
Discussing performance indicators, Marcus et al. (1989)
suggest that "the limitation of these indicators is that they
have been developed incrementally over time to deal with specific
issues as they have arisen and are not part of a broader logical
framework" (p. 23). For the most part, efforts have focused on
developing indicators that are easily available, "objective,"
comparable among plants, and quantitative. Thus, for example,
Olson et al. (1988) operationalized "management" as generic
issues backlog, procedure LERs (Licensee Event Reports), and
administrative LERs. In fact, this seems to be measuring
something by its presumed effects: LERs are a result of
management (and other things), not a "measure" of management.
In contrast, serious management reviews involve more
subjective and process-level information. For example, the NRC
conducts in-depth on-site management and organizational analyses
examining twenty variables (e.g., communications, attitudes and
morale) through systematic interviews and a data collection
instrument (see Marcus et al., pp. 68-69). These seem to form an
implicit theory (or, at least, a checklist) of NPP functioning.
Some interview questions are directly tied to predefined
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management problems such as lack of follow-up on improvement
programs, problems resolving conflicting resource demands, and
emphasis on production over safety and quality. Marcus et al
summarize a useful direction to indicator development in Appendix
3.1, drawing on interviews with NRC staff.
No matter how "objective" the indicators appear to be, there
is unavoidable incompleteness that is exacerbated by the apparent
scientific respectability of quantitative indicators. The
nuclear power industry (e.g., INPO) concentrates on final
outcomes (e.g., accident rates, scrams, radiation releases)
because the industry has done very well when measured in this
way, and because the regulation of outcomes permits the industry
considerable freedom (Marcus et al., p. 70). However, the NRC is
increasingly concerned with safe behaviors rather than safe
outcomes, and seeks to identify and regulate management behaviors
and organizational conditions that are safety-relevant.
RESEARCH PLAN
The Goal of Understanding
Prior research on the issue of organization and management
of NPPs has generally focused on documentation of best practice
and quantitative empiricism. Best practice reports from
"successful" plants try to incrementally improve technical,
procedural, and managerial practices. However, lacking a
comprehensive model of the plant as a whole, including the
processes or mechanisms by which various procedures affect
desired outcomes, we may fall prey to two kinds of errors: (1)
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assembling best practices of various sorts that do not work well
in concert, and (2) failing to go beyond available examples
because we do not understand the relationship between problems
and their solutions. Predictive models that compare quantitative
indices of performance against various organizational, technical,
financial, and contextual variables tend to measure structure and
outcomes but not process (because process is hard to measure),
and treat performance as an additive sum of these variables,
again failing to represent or understand the complex dynamics of
plant management.
Instead, we seek to develop a deeper understanding which
builds upon such predictive relationships, but seeks a more
comprehensive and process-oriented view of NPPs. We believe that
a thorough understanding of NPPs arises through the accumulation
of detailed knowledge of operating plants, and the assembling of
such information into a framework or conceptual model of the
plant and how it learns.
We recognize the need to represent our understanding of NPPs
in compact form, possibly as a quantitative model or a computer
simulation. However, we believe such models presuppose a level
of understanding: as Campbell (1979) has said, "science depends
upon qualitative, common-sense knowing" (p. 50). In short, we
cannot merely accept the quantitative indicators that NPPs
already collect for various financial, regulatory, and management
reasons, but rather permit new indicators to emerge along with
theory. The same view is repeatedly found in prior
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organizational research in NPPs (e.g., Marcus et al., 1989).
Indicators
The overall plan of research is to identify and/or develop
indicators of critical NPP organizational components. We presume
that these indicators would differ markedly from what is
currently available in two ways: first, there would be more
emphasis on the portion of plant behavior labeled "emergent
processes." Marcus et al (1989) left this as a catch-all
category that had few objective, readily-available, indicators.
We find emergent processes to be central to our understanding of
plants. Second, we would include indicators that are qualitative
or more difficult to obtain. Several scholars argue that
perceptions are critical for analyzing NPPs as organizations
(Marcus et al., 1989, p. 55; Weick, 1988). Our goal is
understanding rather than the implementation of a universal
assessment system (as NRC and INPO must achieve). Therefore, we
can afford to strive for a theoretically-rich set of indicators
that may be impractical for other purposes. However, we would
hope that our indicators could be adapted for other purposes in
the future.
Once these indicators were developed, we would "instrument"
some NPPs for a period of time capable of witnessing an entilA
fuel cycle and possible technological and organizational changes
(or failed change efforts). "Instrumentation" would include
readily-available and quantitatively precise data, but would also
include information that could only be obtained by questionnaire,
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interview, on-site observation, or electronic instrumentation
(e.g., video recording). This intensity of data collection
implies studying a small number of plants observed for two or
three years. The plants would be chosen for their
informativeness, such as a plant with an outstanding reputation,
a plant trying to change its management in order to be more
efficient and more safe, or a plant with a very different
approach to effectiveness (perhaps a Swiss or Japanese plant).
Indicator Development
Along with reviews of the literature specific to NPP and
relevant areas of organizational studies, the process of
indicator development would involve:
(a) Interviews with experts who understand NPP functioning
in substantial detail. For example, there are site-visiting
teams used by the NRC and INPO to assess plant performance.
These teams use objective data, interviews, and direct
observation, filtered through their broad experience base, to
determine plant performance. Interviews would seek to determine
their models of plant functioning and their beliefs and insights
about indicators. It would be desirable to accompany such teams
on actual site visits.
(b) Retrospective case studies of particularly informative
plants. For example, we visited Connecticut Yankee because their
performance had deteriorated after many successful years, and
then improved after a change in management. Our interviews with
managers and plant personnel suggested what they believed to be
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the key reasons for poor and good performance, and the "people
management" techniques that they used to affect performance.
Similarly, we visited Maine Yankee to ask them how they had
managed to remain a top-performing plant for so long. Part of
the answer seems to lie in the way they manage external relations
with the NRC and the public.
(c) Fieldwork in NPPs. Observation at one or two carefully-
chosen plants will be carried out by faculty (and possibly
doctoral students) who will spend considerable time on site for a
3 to 6-month period. Collaboration with knowledgeable insiders
(on-site personnel) is essential to this effort, and this
collaboration would include two possible forms: (1) reliance on
expert informants to offer their knowledge and access to various
documents and other personnel, and (2) identification of a group
of insiders to be trained in observation and act as a research
team (in addition to their regular duties). It would be
desirable to have this level of collaboration because insiders
have technical and organizational knowledge and access that
outsiders can achieve only partially after considerable time.
(d) Survey of MIT Nuclear Engineering Graduates. The
Nuclear Engineering Department at MIT has been a central source
of trained personnel for upper-echelon technical and managerial
positions in the nuclear industry. The Department has been in
operation for over 25 years, and has produced hundreds of
graduates who have positions throughout the industry (including
CEO and Vice-President) and in many different countries. A
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mailed questionnaire to these graduates would produce a
tremendous amount of useful information about their specific
plants and utilities, the issues they see, their ideas about
change processes and indicators of organizational
characteristics, their beliefs and values, and so forth. Since
the questionnaire would originate from MIT, we would expect a
high response rate and substantial candor and effort.
(e) Simulator experiments. Improvements in operator skill
and in control room design is traceable, in part, to the
increased use of simulators. Highly realistic mock-ups of
control rooms, with computer-driven displays that model the
responses of a real reactor, offer a way to teach operators, and
to test new procedures and instrument designs. They also offer
an opportunity to experiment with group processes in a controlled
environment, and to develop indicators of group functioning apart
from "performances" (e.g. how they handle a steam tube rupture).
It would be possible to look at extreme situations such as
understaffed control rooms, and to compare the thoughts and
feelings of operators in actual control rooms vs. simulators
(actual control rooms are boring but have real consequences,
simulators have a flurry of activity but no real danger and no
night shifts).
Indicator Content
As we explained previously, the study of organizational life
requires that we examine key functional units, the relationships
within the units and between units, and the ways in which
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learning and change occur or are inhibited. We anticipate that a
very broad range of indicators will be developed to measure plant
characteristics such as organizational structure, typical career
paths, culture, and mental models, and organizational processes
such as standard operating procedures, communication patterns,
exercise of power and accountability, learning and change,
problem finding, planning, and risk assessment.
The measurement of these indicators would be based on a
variety of methods, not limited to readily-available quantitative
information of the sort already reported to INPO and the NRC.
For example, measures of culture would undoubtedly involve on-
site observation and intensive interviews with a broad spectrum
of plant personnel. Communication patterns would be assessed
through self-report inventories of daily activity (with whom one
interacted, through what channels, and what was the content) at
randomly-selected days (Allen & Cohen, 1969). Mental models are
measured by asking respondents to diagram workflows,
communication patterns, and event contingencies (ie., their
"theories" of the plant and the organization). Nuclear plants
are continually assessed for various low probability events.
Techniques such as fault-tree analysis are used to estimate the
likelihood of various types of problems, and these analyses are
used to guide policy and procedures in the plant, and to
communicate with various constituencies (e.g., regulators, the
public). In short, we are likely to use a broad variety of
techniques, and hope to develop new techniques that fit the
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concepts being measures.
Project Manaqement
The NPP Indicators Project would be managed by a faculty
member acting as Project Director. The Project Director would be
in charge of overall management (with the assistance of a staff
Project Manager), and the linkage between specific research
projects and the goals of the overall Indicators Project. The
Project Director would act as Chair of the Research Board,
consisting of all faculty participating in research within the
Project (anticipated to be 4 to 6 people).
The Project would be assisted by an Advisory Board of
academics from relevant social science, management, and
engineering disciplines (examples of people we would ask are Karl
Weick, Henry Mintzberg, Todd LaPorte, Alfie Marcus, Olsen, Andy
VandeVen, Larry Hirschhorn, Chick Perrow, Peter Manning, others
from Nuclear Engineering, Economics, Accounting, Operations
Management) and industry experts (NRC, INPO, utilities). The
size of the Advisory Board would be approximately eight people.
Along with the faculty investigators on the project, we
would anticipate having a visitor each year such as Peter Manning
or Alfie Marcus to conduct their own research and assist ongoing
projects.
We anticipate having an Annual Conference of the project
personnel, Advisory Board and sponsors to discuss objectives,
plans, and progress. From the second year onward, this
Conference could be expanded to a research conference for those
34
concerned with the management of high reliability and high
technology systems such as NPPs.
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APPENDIX
HISTORY OF CONCERN FOR SAFETY IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
The most useful way to understand the nuclear industry and
the nature of organization and management in the industry is to
have a brief historical outline.
Early History
The nuclear industry traces its development to the Manhattan
Project's first controlled chain reaction on a squash court at
the University of Chicago in 1942. By 1946, the Project had
built the first peacetime reactor at Oak Ridge National
Laboratories. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 converted the
Project into the Atomic Energy Commission, which continued
reactor development as a military effort focused on weapons
stockpiles. At the instigation of Hyman Rickover, the Navy
developed a nuclear-powered submarine lauched in 1955 with a
small pressurized-water reactor (PWR) built by Westinghouse.
Early in the Eisenhower Administration, the government began
to push for industrial powerplants. The Navy large reactor
program was canceled and the large PWR project was rechannelled
to powerplants. The AEC began a 5-year demonstration testing
five types of reactors, including the Navy PWR and a boiling-
water reactor (BWR) developed at Argonne National Laboratory and
adopted by General Electric.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permitted industry to "use and
process" nuclear material, thus shifting the government role from
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monopoly to regulation. However, industry was still unwilling to
take financial risks, so the AEC established a system of
subsidies until 1963. The first commercial NPP went into
operation in 1957. By 1963, the workability of both PWRs and
BWRs was established, 13 "turnkey" projects were ordered from GE
and Westinghouse for various utilities, and 27 other plants were
ordered from various vendors. Expansion continued through the
1960s, with growing numbers of plants, and increased size of
plants.
A 1967 report showed that containment in the new larger
units could not be assured in the event of a core meltdown, and
the AEC began to shift from accident prevention to accident
mitigation and quality assurance. Environmental activism began
to slow construction of new plants. Charges of conflict of
interest resulted in the AEC being split in 1974 into the Energy
Research and Development Adminsitration (to promote nuclear
power) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Increased
regulatory demands, tight capital markets, and decline of
electric consuption growth in the 1970s led to deep uncertainty
in the industry, capped by the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident
in 1979.
Three Mile Island
TMI illustrates the Perrow-style nightmare of a system
accident. A minor failure in the non-nuclear feedwater loop
resulted in increased pressure and temperature in the primary
loop that cools the reactor. The pressure relief valve
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automatically opened but remained stuck in the open position,
permitting a loss of coolant through the open valve. Because
there was no positive indicator of valve position and there was a
history of misleading temperature readings due to small leaks,
operators erroneously believed the valve was closed for two
hours. Following their training, they attempted to maintain
proper pressure in the system without "going solid" or filling
the pressurizer with water. Unfortunately, because of steam
bubbles in the pressurizer, pressure remained high although the
level of coolant was actually low. The operators discounted high
temperature readings that were known to fluctuate even under
normal conditions. Since the operators were preventing emergency
systems from pumping more coolant into the system, the core was
uncovered and had no way to dissipate its heat, the zirconium
fuel rods reacted with steam to create hydrogen gas and weakened
fuel rods which ruptured, and serious damage resulted.
Although TMI can be traced to a combination of physical
malfunctions and operator misdiagnoses that overrode safety
systems, the true causes are more complex. The operators were
doing what their training told them to do, and what the vendor
(Babcock and Wilcox) recommended. The fact that they did not
understand the events unfolding was at least partly due to their
lack of training for this scenario; in short, their "mental
model" of the plant and accident scenarios was deficient.
Yet, there is an even deeper cause: there were precursor
events at TMI and other plants that should have led to changes in
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equipment, procedures, and training in time to prevent the
accident. Virtually identical "transients" involving stuck-open
pressure-relief valves occurred in 1974 at a Westinghouse reactor
in Switzerland, and in 1977 at a very similar Babcock and Wilcox
plant in Toledo (Davis Besse). The Davis Besse accident was
thoroughly analyzed by Toledo Edison, Babcock and Wilcox, and the
NRC. They knew that the valve could stick open, that level
readings could be erroneous, and that the dangers of "going
solid" were mild compared to the risk of uncovering the core, but
none of this information was communicated to Metropolitan Edison
(the owners of TMI) or the operators at TMI.
Underlying this lack of communication and failure of
organizational learning were several factors: the NRC focused
primarily on reactor design review rather than reactor
operations; the thousands of reports going to the NRC were hard
to analyze, difficult to diagnose and classify, and were not
systematically reviewed for safety problems; utilities did not
share information about safety-related operational problems among
themselves or with vendors; vendors were inconsistent in
monitoring operations in plants they had built.
Post-TMI
It is unfortunate that it takes a disaster like TMI, or
Challenger, to create reforms. TMI was intensively analyzed
(Kemeny et al., 1979, Rogovin & Frampton, 1980) and significant
change resulted. NRC internal organization and reporting
requirements changed, including NRC on-site personnel at each
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plant. The industry created the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations (INPO) to collect and analyze information, train and
accredit operators, evaluate plants, promote innovations,
disseminate information, and so forth. New operating procedures
were instituted including technically-trained personnel in the
control room, new training requirements for operators, far more
detailed operations manuals, new training procedures with
increased use of simulators, more intensive and useful reporting
requirements to the NRC and INPO, specific changes in equipment
to prevent a TMI-type accident, and many other innovations.
The net result of all this effort has been beneficial.
Reactor operations have become the focus of attention (no new U.
S. reactors have been designed in many years!). Far more
information is being exchanged among plants, utilities, vendors,
and regulators. According to INPO, performance of NPPs on safety
and efficiency criteria have steadily improved during the 1980s.
For example, unplanned automatic scrams while critical have
declined from 7.4 in 1980 to 2.1 in 1988. However, although the
average "health" of the industry has improved, several key issues
remain: is the industry healthy enough, given the desire to
reduce risk in this industry; do the indicators of health tell
the whole story with sufficient accuracy; and what can be done
with the minority of plants that are clearly deficient on many
indicators?
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